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STANDARDS VERSUS STANDARDS: THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT POLLUTION RESTRIC-
TIONS ON THE FIRM'S DYNAMIC INVESTNIENT POLICY
In Helfand (1991) the effects of different pollution standards on the
firm's resource allocation decisions are determined within a comparative
static analysis. The purpose of this paper is to establish the implica-
tions of such standards within a dynamic framework. To do so a dynamic
model of the firm is developed in which it is assumed that production
causes pollution as an inevitable byproduct. Concerning its investment
policy we suppose that the firm can choose between investing in productive
capital goods and investing in abatement efforts.
It is shown that in some cases (future) abatement expenses have a negative
impact on the present level of productive investment, even if the pollu-
tion standard is not binding at the moment. This implies a really dynamic
optimal investment policy for the firm, which cannot be obtained within a
comparative static analysis.3
1. Introduction
The well. known environmental debate between economists and policy makers
nowadays is about what instrument should be used to reduce the level of
pollution. The standpoint of economists is clearly stated by Ingham and
Ulph (1991). They begin by argueing that, according to the analysis of
Baumol and Oates (19~1), efficiency requires that abatement methods must
be exploited such, that marginal abatement costs are equal across all
methods. This result ].eads to the argument that price-related regulations,
such as taxes or marketable permits, are preferable to standards. 1'he
reason is that it would be an impossible task for the government to fix
all standards such that marginal abatement costs are equal, while by im-
posing a tax marginal abatement costs are automatically equalized, because
all polluters will abate such that marginal abatement costs equal the tax.
On the other hand, practice shows that in most cases policy makers prefer
standards rather than taxes or permits. In the literature papers can be
found that try to find reasons for the occurrence of this paradox. For
example, Buchanan and Tullock (1975) argue that firms will prefer emission
standards to emission taxes because standards serve as a barrier to entry
for new firms so that existing firms collect moi~e profits. Their argument
is based on the view that indtistry is able to exert its preference for a
particular instrument because it is more likely to be well-organized tt~an
consumers. Ulph (1990) obtains that, by analyzing a multiple country game,
standards should be preferred to taxes, because the use of standards per-
mits greater commitment by producers and this allows them to earn higher
surpluses. Moreover, in studying practical applications Hahn (1989) has4
shown that the performance of market based environmental systems is dis-
appointing.
When economists refer to pollution standards, they almost universally mean
uniform restrictions on pollution emissions. However, in practice, stan-
dards take many forms: not only emissions reatrictions, but also restric-
tions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input, restric-
tions on the use of a polluting input, or mandated use of a particular
pollution-control technology. In Helfand (1991) the implications of a
range of standards are studied within a comparative static framework. The
purpose of this paper is to extend Helfand's work by establishing the
effects of standards in a dynamic environment.
In Section 2 the model is formulated, while in Section 3 we examine the
effects of introducing five different kinds of standards, namely: a fixed
level of emissions, a fixed level of emissions per unit of output, a fixed
level of emissions per unit of an input, a fixed level of output, and a
fixed level of an input. In Section 4 we compare the results of the dif-
ferent standards among each other and with the outcome of Helfand's ana-
lysis. Section 5 contains a summary and some general conclusions.
2. The Model
Consider a firm that owns a stock of capital goods K. In order to concen-
trate on pollution effects rather than capital-labor substitutions we
asaume that the labor-capital ratio is fixed:
L - ~K (1)5
in which:
L : stock of labor
,~ : labor-capital ratio (~ ~ 0 and constant).
Ttre firm produces a homogeneous output and production will be proportional
to the inputs:l)
Q - 9K - qLI~ (2)
in which:
Q : production rate
q: capital productivity (q ) 0 and constant).
We assume that the sales level is an increasing function of production
with decreasing marginal sales:
G(Q) - P(Q)Q
in which:
P- P(Q) : selling price per unit of production
G- C(Q) : sales rate, G Z 0, G' ~ 0, G" C 0, G(0) - 0.
(3)
1) The results of this paper can also be obtained after assuming that Q is
a concave function of K, except that then the stability analysis is more
complicated.6
G' being greater than zero says that the demand function is elastic with
respect to the price, i.e. -(P~Q)(dQ~dP) ) 1, and G" C 0 is equivalent
with assuming that 2P' C-P"Q.2)
Due to the fixed labor-capital ratio, earnings, being equal to the dif-
ference between sales and labor costs, are a concave function of K. By
using (1)-(3) this can be expressed as follows:
S(K) - (9P(qK) - w~)K
in which:
S(K) : earnings rate, S 2 0, S' ) 0, S" ( 0, S(0) - 0
w : wage rate (w ) 0 and constant).
Capital stock decreases by depreciation and can be increased by productive
investment:
K- I- aK, K(0) - K~
in which:
I: rate of productive investment
a : depreciation rate.
-------------------------------------------------------
(5)
2) The major conclusions of this paper are not affected if, instead, we
assume that the firm faces a horizontal output demand curve, i.e. P is
constant.The firro also produces pollution. Following Dasgupta (1982, pp. 152-154)
(see also Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991)) the emission-output ratio can
be reduced by investment in clean technology. In this way the emission-
output ratio, and thus the emission-capital ratio (cf. (2)), becomes a
decreasing function of abatement investment:
E - a(A)Q - e(A)K
in which:
E : amount of emissions
A : abatement investments
a(A) : emission-output ratio, a' ( 0, a" ~ 0
e(A) : emission-capital ratio, e(A} - qa(A), e' ~ 0, e" ) 0.
(6)
According to Dasgupta (1982) abatement investments can arise if, for
example, the firm uses different input mixes for production so that less
pollution is generated. In practice we can think of switching to solar
energy for the generation of domestic heating and thereby reducing S02
emission, or, in the case of crop production, substituting the use of
pesticides by alternative techniques which involve, among other things,
special planting combinations, the use of repellents and hormones, and the
introduction of beneficial insects.
Note that A- 0 is associated with the production technology that would be
chosen by a profit maximizing firm in absence of any environmental regula-
tions. Hence, the emission-output ratio associated with this technology is
a(0). The assumption of diminishing returns to abatement investments8
(a" ) 0) seems to be realistic (see Kneese and Schultze (1975, Chapter 2)
for practical examples).
Abatement investment are non-negative:
A ~ 0. (7)
The firm is assumed to behave so as to maximize the net cash flow stream.
After supposing that, due to adjustment costs, convex costs are associated
to productive investments, and abatement investments face a horizontal
supply curve, we arrive at the following objective function:




C(I) : costs of productive investment, C(0) - C'(0) - 0, C" ) 0
r : discount rate
v : price of a unit of abatement investment (v ) 0 and con-
stant).
To facilitate the analysis later on we introduce the following additional
assumption concerning the shape of the emission-capital ratio function:
2(e')2 ~ ee". (9)9
3. The Constraints
Here, we study the implications of five kinds of different pollution stan-
dards. We start by incorporating a maximal emission standard and proceed
by introducing restrictions on emissions level per unit of output, emis-
sions level per unit of an input, output level, and input level, respect-
ively.
But, in order to serve as a benchmark, we first derive the solution in
case there are no environmental regulations. Then there is no incentive
for abatement investments, implying that A- 0. Hence, the control problem
left to be solved is given by (5) and (8) with A- 0. The current value
Hamiltonian equals:
H - S(K) - C(I) t ~(I-aK).
The necessary conditions are:
(10)
~ - C'(I) (11)
a - (rta)a - S'(K). (12)
These conditions are also sufficient for optimality provided that the
following transversality condition holds for every feasible solution K
(cf. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986)):
lim exp(-rt)~(t)[K(t) - K(t)] Z 0. (13)
t-~10
From (11) and (12) we can derive:
. i {(r.a)C'(I) - S'(K)}.
I - C"(I)
The steady state follows from (5) and (14) and can be expressed as:
(14)
n n
I ' ~ (15)
S~(K) - (rta)C'(I). (16)
The determinant of the Jacobian of the system (5), and (14), which is
evaluated in (Í,~), is negative so that the dynamics corresponds to a
saddle point.
After solving the differential equation ( 12), substituting (11) into this
relation, and using ( 16) as a fixed point, we obtain:
J S'(K(s))exp(-(a;r)(s-t))ds - C'(I(t)) - 0.
t
(17)
The first term of (17) stands for the discounted marginal earnings stream
caused by an additional unit of investment at time "t". Here it is
reckoned with the fact that capital depreciates and therefore increases
only with exp(-a(s-t)) at each time s) t. The second term represents the
initial outlay that is required to raise the capital stock by one unit at
time "t". Hence the left-hand side of (17) is equal to the benefit of an
investment of one dollar and, according to business economics terminology,
we denote this benefit by net present value of marginal investment (NPVMI)11
(see also Kort (1989, 1990)). From (1~) we infer that the NPVMI equals
zero. Therefore for the firm's investment policy to be optimal it is
required that marginal earnings equal marginal expenses.
3.1. Standard as a Set Level of Fmissions
Let ZE be the numerical standard set when emissions are regulated by the
amount of total pollution permissible per unit of time. From (6) we derive
that the following constraint has to be imposed:
e(A)K s ZE. (18)
Now we need to solve the control problem represented by (5), (7), (8) and
(18). We first note that A only occurs in the objective and in the con-
straints, but not in the system dynamics (5). Therefore, the problem can
be solved by application of a two-step procedure (see e.g. Feichtinger and
Hartl (1986, pp. 397-402) and Hartl (1988)).
Step 1:
Solve for every fixed K the static optimization problem:
max {-vA~e(A)K s ZE; A Z 0}.
A
(19)
After deriving the Kuhn Tucker conditions we obtain that the solution of
(19) is given by A- AE(K), where AE(K) equals:12
0 s ZE~e(0)
AE(K) - A~(K) for K ) ZE~e(0) ~
where A~(K) is an implicit function that satisfies:
e(A~(K) )K - ZE.
The derivatives of this abatement function are given by:
A~(K) - -e~e'K ) 0





The "greater than"-sign in (23) is due to assumption (9). Hence AE is a
convex non-decreasing function of K.
Step 2:
Solve for A- AE(K) the control problem represented by (5) and (8). The
Hamiltonian is given by:
HE ~ S(K) - vAE(K) - C(I) . ~E(I-sK).




~E - (rfa)aE - S'(K) 4 vAÉ(K). (2()i3
Because AE(K) is convex, these conditions are also sufficient for optimal-
ity provided that a transversality condition like (13) is satisfied.
Due to (25) and (26) we get:
I- C„~I) {(rta)C'(I) - S'(K) t vAÉ(K)}. (27)
Now we carry out a(state-control) phase plane analysis for the differen-
tial equation system ((5), (2~)). Due to (20), (22) and (2~) we derive
that the I- 0 isocline jumps downwards when K equals ZE~e(0). From
Figure 1 we obtain that there are three possible configurations.
[Place Figure 1 about here]
Because oF (20) the I- 0 isocline, which in Figure 1 is denoted by
IE - 0, consist of two parts. For K less than ZE~e(0) it holds that
AE(K) - 0(cf. (20)) and therefore the IE - 0 isocline coincides with the
I- 0 isocline of the unregulated case (cf. (14), (2~)). Hence, if the
equilibrium point is such that K~ ZE~e(0), then we have the same equilib-
rium point for the regulated and the unregulated case (see configuration
(iii) in Figure 1). For K ~ ZE~e(0) the IE - 0 isocline of the regulated
case is situated below the I- 0 isocline of the unregulated case. There-
fore, the equilibrium points differ (configurations (i), (ii)) and in14
Figure 1 the equilibrium point of the unregulated case is denoted by o and
the equilibrium point of the regulated case by ..
In Figure 2 the three configurations are drawn in separate phasediagrams.
Also here the saddlepoint of the unregulated case (K,Í) is denoted by o
and of the regulated case (KE,ÍE) by ..
[Place Figure 2 about here]
In configuration (i) the equilibrium level of capital stock in the regu-
lated case satisfies:
S'(KE) - (rta)C'(aKE) t vAÉ(KE). (28)
(28) says that in equilibrium marginal earnings equal the sum of marginal
investment costs and marginal abatement expenses necessary to keep pollu-
tion equal to the standard level when capital stock increases marginally.
It is easy to check that the determinsnt of the Jacobian is negative so
that this equilibrium point is a saddlepoint as well. Compared to the
equilibrium level in the unregulated case (cf. (15), (16)), here the
capital stock is lower which is due to the abatement expenses that are
forced by the standard.
In configuration (ii) the equilibrium level of capital stock equals
ZE~e(0) and it satisfies:
(rta)C'(aKE) C S'(KE) ~(r;a)C'(aKE) f vAÉ(KE). (29)15
From the first inequality of (29) we infer that marginal earnings exceed
margina] investment costs, so it would be optimal for the firm to grow
further when no abatement investments are necessary. But when the firm
grows beyond ZE~e(0), then abatement expenditures are needed to meet the
standard (cf. (20)). Hence, marginal costs increase with the abatement
costs and from the second inequality of (29) we obtain that this implies
that total marginal costs exceed marginal earnings. This means that it is
optimal for the firm to keep the level of capital stock equal to ZE~e(0).
From the first inequality of (29) we also derive that the equilibrium
level of capital stock in the unregulated case exceeds the one in the
regulated case.
In configuration (iii) the equilibrium point is given by:
S'(KE) - (r'a)C~(~E)- (30)
Here the equilibrium level is such (KE ( ZE~e(0)) that no abatement expen-
ditures are necessary to meet the standard. Therefore no abatement costs
are contained in the marginal earnings-cost relation of (30). Comparing
(16) and (30) shows that the equilibrium levels of the regulated and the
unregulated case are the same.
We see that imposing the emission standard only reduces the equilibrium
level when K is higher than ZE~e(0). This brings us to the conclusion that
especially large firms are influenced by an emission standard. This
feature was also found in Helfand (1991).
From Figure 2 we obtain that in the configurations (i) and (ii) the in-
vestment level is always lower in the regulated case. In configuration
(iii) this only holds for large values of capital stock, namely for those16
values where abatement investments are needed to satisfy the standard. In
configureations (i) and (ii) it turns out that investments are lower even
when abatement expenditures are not yet required. This behavior can be
confirmed by a net present value rule. Suppose that the firm starts out
with a capital stock lower than ZE~e(0) and that this level is reached at
time "tE". Then, from the optimality conditions we can derive the follow-
ing expression for the net present value of marginal investment (NPVMI):
f S'(K(s))exp(-(a4r)(s-t))ds - f vAÉ(K(s))exp(-(atr)(s-t))ds - C'(I) - 0.
t tE
(31)
Because the second term is positive the investment level must be reduced
(compared to the unregulated case (cf. (1~))) to keep the NPVMI equal to
zero. This equation confirms that at each moment of time the firm reckons
with future abatement expenditures when it determines its investment rate.
The reason for this is that when the firm invests one dollar at time "t",
capital stock increases with exp(-a(s-t)) at each time s) t implying that
at each time s ~ tE additional abatement expenditures are necessary to
keep pollution equal to ZE.
When we consider a firm starting out with a capital stock below ZE~e(0) in
configuration (iii), then K will remain below ZE~e(0). This implies that
no future abatement expenditures are needed, so the second term in (31)
disappears which means that the NPVMI-expression becomes equal to the one
in the unregulated case (cf. (1~)). Therefore the investment levels of the
regulated and unregulated case coincide here.1~
3.2. Standard as Fmissions per Unit of Output
Let ZEQ be the standard expressed as a set level of pollution per unit of
output. According to (6) this amounts to:
e(A)K s ZEQQ.




Abatement expenditures are costly and, therefore, it is optimal for the
firm to put them as low as possible. In this way optimal abatement invest-







Hence, abatement expenditures are constant over time and also independent
of the stock of capital goods. Abatement expenditures are not needed when
the emissi.on-output ratio without abatement efforts (e(0)~q) already
satisfies the standard. But the standard can also be so restrictive that
over the whole planning period the firm must assign a constant amount of
money to abatement investments in order to reduce the emission-output18
ratio. As said before A does not depend on K and thus the remaining con-
trol problem can be solved independently from A. Consequently, this leads
to the same productive investment policy as in the unrestricted case and
thus (i5)-(i~) also apply here.
From an economic point of view, the level of productive investment being
unaffected by the emissions per unit of output standard can be explaíned
by noting that here having an increased stock of capital goods does not
have consequences for (future) abatement expenses. Therefore abatement
costs do not occur in the NPVMI-relation (cf. (1~)). Because abatement
expenses are the same for a large and a small firm, an emission per unit
of output standard seems to be unfavorable for small firms.
3.3. Standard as Emissions per Unit oP a Specified Input
Two cases are possible here: regulating pollution per unit of capital
goods or regulating pollution per unit of abatement investments. The first
possibility leads to the following mathematical representation:
e(A)K 5 ZEKK. (3()
After dividing both sides by K we conclude that imposing this constraint
is similar to imposing the emissions per unit of output standard and,
therefore, the results stated in the previous subsection also apply here.
Regulating pollution per unit of abatement investments leads to the fol-
lowing constraint:
e(A)K 5 Z~A. (37)19
Since abatement investments are costly there is no reason for the firm to
invest in abatement activities more than required by the standard. Hence,
throughout the whole planning period A will be an implicit function of K,
A - A~(K), that satisfies:
e(AEA(K) )K - Z~A~(K) .
From (38) we derive:
(38)
AÉA(K) - e~(ZEA-e~K) ~ 0 (39)
AËA(K) -{2e'ZEA t K(-2(e')2 t ee")}e~(ZEA-e K)3' (40)
The sign of the second derivative is ambiguous because in the numerator
the first term is negative, while the second term is positive due to
assumption (9).
As step 2 we now need to solve the control problem represented by (5) and
(8) for A- AEA(K). The Hamiltonian is given by:
HEA - S(K) - vAEA(K) - C(I) t~~(I-aK).
Then the necessary conditions are:
~EA - C'(I)
~EA - (r}a)~EA




From these two conditions we derive:
I- C„~I) {(r{a)C'(I) - S'(K) t vAÉA(K)}. (44)
The steady state value of capital stock can be obtained from (5) and (44):
S' (K~) - (ria)C' (aK~) t vA~(K~). (45)
Comparing (15)-(16) and (45) leads to the conclusion that this steady
state value is lower than in the unregulated case. The determinant of the
Jacobian evaluated in the steady state equals -a(r}a)C" . S" - vA". Notice
that negativity of this determinant is not assured because one of the two
terms in the numerator of A" is negative. However, it is likely that nega-
tivity of this term is compensated by the other term in the numerator of
A" and by the first two terms of the determinant. Hence, also here we
suppose that the dynamics corresponds to a saddlepoint.
From the optimality conditions we obtain the following NPVMI-relation:
f {S'(K(s)) - vA~(K(s))}exp(-(rta)(s-t))ds - C'(I(t)) - 0. (46)
t
Due to the fact that the firm abates such that the standard is just satis-
fied (cf. (38)) an additional investment expenditure immediately requires
extra abatement expenses. Therefore these are subtracted from marginal
earnings in the NPVMI-relation, which implies that the level of productive
investment is lower than in the unregulated case.21
The difference with the emissions standard is that here throughout the
whole planning period abatement expenses are required to meet the emis-
sions per unit of abatement standard, while with the emissions standard
this is only the case when capital goods exceed a certain level. Hence,
unlike the emissions standard, the emissions per unit of abatement stan-
dard does not favor the small firms.
According to the analysis of Helfand (1991) the performance of three
standards (emissions per unit of output and emissions per unit of either
input) cannot be readily distinguished from each other. Here it holds that
imposing standards that restrict emissions per unit of output and emis-
sions per unit of capital goods lead to the same results. But the outcome
of imposing a standard that restricts the emissions per unit of abatement
input is quite different, bec~.juse the latter results in abatement expenses
that increase with capital goods (cf. (39)) while abatement expenses are
constant in the cases of an emission per unit of output standard and an
emissions per unit of capital goods standard.
We found out that the emissions standard favors the small firm, while the
emissions per unit of output or per unit of capital goods standard favor
the large firm. It seems that the emissions per unit of abatement standard
dues not discriminate any firm.
3.4. Standard as a Set Level of Total Output
The constraint to be added is now:
qK s ZQ. (47)22
Because pollution, or pollution per unit output or input, is not directly
restricted here, abatement expenses are not of any use to the firm, so
throughout the whole planning period it holds that A- 0. Thus the control
problem to be solved is represented by (5), (8) (with A- 0) and (4~),
where the latter is a pure state constraint. Of course it has to be im-
posed that K(0) S ZQ~q. By using the direct method (see Feichtinger and
Hartl (1986)) the Lagrangian equals:
L- S(K) - C(I) t~Q(I-aK) . uQ(ZQ~q-K).
The necessary conditions are:
(48)
aQ - C'(I) (49}
~Q - (rta)~ - S'(K) i KQ (50)
uQ(Ze~q-K) - 0. ue 2 0. (51)
Due to the fact that the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in I it is regu-
lar. Now, from Corollaries 6.2, 6.3a of Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) and
due to satisfaction of constraint qualification (6.1~) of Feichtinger and
Hartl (1986) we get that I and aQ are continuous.
To obtain the optimal investment policy we follow the approach of
Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, pp. 218-219). First, notice that there are
two possibilities:
a. K(t) ~ ZQ~q dt.23
This implies that ~Q - 0 so that the optimality conditions are the same as
in the unregulated case. Consequently, the optimal investment policy is
here also given by (1~).
b. K reaches its upperbound at a certain point of time.
Starting at K- KD we have to find a trajectory that satisfies the con-
straint as well as the necessary conditions everywhere. To do so we
intersect K- Ze~q with the K- 0 isocline and study the trajectory that
ends in this intersection point, which is denoted by (K I)(see
Q' Q
Figure 3).
[Place Figure 3 about here]
If we choose for K- K~ the corresponding investment rate on this trajec-
tory then the point (KQ,IQ) is reached at a finite point of time tQ. Then
it makes sense to choose the control I- IQ for t E(tQ,m).
The necessary conditions are of course satisfied for t s tQ. For t) tQ it
holds that ~Q - C'(IQ). Hence ~Q - 0, and we obtain (after noticing that
KQ C K and K satisfies (cf. (16)): S'(K) -(rta)C'(Í)):
uQ - S'(KQ) - (rta)C'(IQ) ) 0. (52)
Hence, also for t) tQ the necessary conditions are fulfilled. Because K
and ~ are always finite on this trajectory the sufficient conditions from24
Theorem ~.5 in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986) are satisfied, which means
that the constructed solution is really optimal.
From the figure we infer that, compared to the unrestricted problem, the
investment rate is lower. Hence, like in the problem with the emissions
standard, in determining its investment policy the firm seems to reckon
with the fact that the maximal output level will be reached after a while.
This is confirmed by the NPVMI-relation which has the following form:
m
f S'(K(s))exp(-(a;r)(s-t))ds - f uQ(s)exp(-(atr)(s-t))ds - C'(I) - 0.
t tQ
(53)
So, like in the previous solutions, the firms investment policy has a
really dynamic structure. Therefore, such a result can not be obtained
within a comparative static context (cf. Helfand (1991)). One of the
results that coincide with Helfand is that the use of both inputs (K as
well as A) decreases in this case.
3.5- Standard as a Set Amount of a Specified Input
This standard takes two forms. A maximum cnn be set on the stock of cepi-
tal goods; alternatively, imposing a minimum level on the use of an abate-
ment input captures the effect of imposing a particular pollution-control
technology on a firm. The first possibility leads to the following mathe-
matical representation:
x s zK. (54)25
After comparing (4~) and (54) we conclude that setting a maximum on the
capital stock will have the same effect as restricting the level of total
output and, therefore, the results stated in the previous subsection also
apply here.
Imposing a minimum level on the level of abatement investment gives the
following constraint:
A 2 ZA. (55)
The optimal control problem to be solved consists of the expressions (5),
(8) and (55). Since abatement investments have to be paid for, the optimal
policy is to put them as low as possible, i.e. A(t) - ZA for all t. Fur-
thermore, the firm will apply the same productive investment policy as in
the unregulated case, because abatement costs will not be influenced by an
increase of capital goods. Hence, the level of productive investment
satisfies the NPVMI-relation (17).
4. Comparisons of the Different Standards
Like in Helfand (1991) comparisons among the standards can only be made
when they are normalized. Here we normalize the standards such that in
each steady state the firm prodiices the same amount of pollution. Also, we
consider only those solutions where the standard has the biggest impact.
For example, in case of the emissions standard (E) we arrived at three
solutions and here we pick that solution where at the end abatement ex-
penses are needed to satisfy the standard.26
As was noted in the previous section restricting the emissions per unit of
output (EQ) and restricting the emissions per unit of capital goods (EK)
lead to the same outcome and this also holds for the maximal output stan-
dard (Q) and the maximal capital stock standard (K). Further we derived
that abatement expenditures are constant when the emissions per unit of
output standard and the minimal abatement standard (A) are imposed.
Because the productive investment policy coincides under these two stan-
dards and normalization requires that the amount of pollution must be the
same in the steady state, the abatement expenditures must be the same too
and thus the performance of standards EQ and A will be equal after normal-
ization. This brings us to the conclusion that, after normalizing the
standards, we have to consider four different solutions, namely the solu-
tions resulting from imposing the emissions standard, the emissions per
unit of output standard, the emissions per unit of abatement investment
standard and the maximal output standard, respectively. Together with the
unregulated case they are depicted in Figure 4, in which it is assumed
that the firm starts out with a rather low level of capital stock.
[Place Figure 4 about here]
Because the productive investment policy is the same, the development of
capital stock over time in the unrestricted case coincides with the solu-
tion where the emissions per unit of output are restricted. We see that
over the whole planning period this emission per unit of output standard
gives the highest level of capital stock. Because the firm does not spendmoney on abateroent efforts in the case of a maximal output standard and
the amount of emissions must be equal in the end, the level of capital
stock will be mostly reduced in this case.3)
As just mentioned, restricting emissions per unit of output gives the
highest level of capital stock. Then abatement expenditures must also be
at the highest level, because emissions are the same in the end. In the
case of an emissions standard we First have a period of zero abatement
investment and it becomes positive as soon as the standard level of emis-
sions is reached. Contrary to this, in the case of the emi.ssions per unit.
of abatement investment standard the firm will carry out abatement invest-
ments during the whole planning period.
Of course, the amount of emissions reaches the highest level in the un-
restricted case. For the different standards it holds that the amount of
emissions is the same in the end, due to the normalization. Unlike the
other standards, this emissions level is already reached within a finite
time period when an emissions standard is imposed. At the start of the
planning period emissions are mostly reduced in the case of an emissions
per unit of output standard, because imposing the latter results in a high
constant level of abatement expenditures over the whole planning period.
In case that, like in our model, the abatement input does not contribute
to productíon, the analysis of Helfand (1991) leads to the conclusion that
standards can be divided into two groups which give the same performance.
The first group, consisting of the standards E, EQ, EK, EA and A, leads to
-------------------------------------------------------
3) The relative levels of capital stock between the emissions standard and
the emissions per unit of abatement investment standard cannot be deter-
mined. On the diagram it is assumed that these levels are equal in the end
and that in the beginning capital stock grows faster in case of an emis-
sions st~indard. The latter seems to make sense because then there are no
abatement expenditures in this case.zs
higher levels of input, output and profits than the second group, which
contains the standards Q and K. From our dynamic analysis it can be con-
cluded that, contrary to Helfand (1991), standards E and EA lead to lower
levels of input and output than the standards EQ, EK and A. But the profit
level of standard E is higher than that of all other standards. This is
because the solutions of these standards all satisfy the emissions con-
straint so that they are feasible in case of an emissions standard. But,
apparently they are not optimal, which implies that their profit levels
are lower than that of the optimal solution in case of an emissions stan-
dard.
5. Sumunary and Conclusions
In this paper we studied the dynamic behavior of the firm under different
pollution standards. In the economic theory a pollution standard ís syno-
nym to restricting the amount of emissions, but in practice standards can
take many forms. Here we follow the approach of Helfand (1991) who con-
sidered standards that restrict emissions, emissions per unit of output,
emissions per unit of an input, output and use of an input, respectively.
We extend Helfand's comparative static analysis by considering a dynamic
framework.
We developed a dynamic model of the firm in which output was produced by
labor and capital stock in fixed proportion. Where labor could be adjusted
freely, capital stock could be raised by (productive) investments which
are subject to adjustment costs. The production process also generates
pollution as an inevitable byproduct. If, in order to satisfy a pollution29
standard, the amount oF emissions must be reduced, we assumed that this
could not only be done by decreasing the production rate but also by car-
rying out abatement investments through which the emissions-output ratio
could be diminished.
It turned out that the firm's productive investment policy had a really
dynamic structure. In all cases the level of productive investment could
be determined by a dynamic investment decision rule that is based on the
concept net present value of marginal investment. From our analysis we in-
fer that the firm's productive investment policy is not changed when an
emissions per unit of output standard, or an emissions per unit of capital
goods standard, or a minimal abatement investment standard is imposed. In
case of an emissions standard, a maximal output standard and a maximal
capital goods standard, already at the beginning of the planning period
productive investment is reduced in order to anticipate on the time period
that the standard becomes binding.
Abatement expenditures turn out to be zero when a maximal oiitput standard
or a maximal capital goods standard is imposed, because then there is no
incentive for the firm to reduce pollution. In case of an emissions per
unit output standard, an emissions per unit of capital goods standard and
a minimal abatement investment standard, abatement investments are
constant over time. When emissions are restricted abatement investments
are zero as long as the amount of emíssions is below standard level, while
abatement investments are always positive in case of an emissions per unit
of abatement investment standard.
The advantage of this work compared to Helfand (1991) is that our analysis
is dynamic. The application of optimal control to this general problem
yields insights regarding the possible intertemporal effects of pollution30
standards. This is important since policy makers need to be concerned
about "short-run" effects of policy that occur before a final equilibrium
is reached. Since the time required to reach dynamic equilibrium varies
and in some instances could be significant, characterization of the pos-
sible approach paths paints a picture of what life might be like in a time
frame that may not be that "short". This kind of knowledge may be useful
as input to policy decisions.
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Figure captions
Figure 1. Three possible configurations in the state-control phasediagram.
Figure 2. The optimal solution in the cases (i)-(iii): unregulated case
(...), regulated case (-).
Figure 3. The optimal solution of the problem with the maximal output
standard (-) and oF the problem with no constraints (...).
Figure 4. Capital stock, abatement investments and amount of emissions as
functions of time in five different solutions: unregulated solu-
tion (...), emissions standard solution (---), emissions per
output standard solution (-.-.-.), emissions per abatement in-
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